



Guardian of the Straits: Ottoman Naval Battles at the Dardanelles (1656-1915) and Implications for Turkey's Maritime Security

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Abstract

This article examines four major naval battles (1656, 1657, 1807, and 1915) that took place in the Dardanelles during the Ottoman Empire period. The study analyzes the historical context, causes, course, and consequences of these battles, emphasizing the strategic importance of the Dardanelles. Furthermore, in light of the lessons drawn from these historical events, the article offers recommendations for modern Turkey's maritime security policies. By highlighting the importance of strait defense, naval power, technological superiority, and international cooperation, the article aims to contribute to Turkey's future maritime security strategies.

Keywords: Dardanelles, Ottoman naval battles, maritime strategy, strait defense, Turkey's maritime security

Introduction

The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus have been among the world's most strategic waterways throughout history. These straits are of great importance both commercially and militarily, as they form the only maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean¹. Controlling these straits has been one of the primary objectives of states and empires ruling in the Balkans and Anatolia from ancient times to the present day.

The strategic importance of the Dardanelles is also supported by archaeological findings. According to underwater archaeologists, there are more than ten thousand shipwrecks in the strait

¹ Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (1994), pp. 7-9.

dating from ancient times to the present. The presence of numerous warships among these remains indicates that the region has been the scene of conflicts throughout history².

The importance of the Dardanelles increased even further during the Ottoman Empire period. Control of the strait was seen as the first step in the conquest of Istanbul and was of vital importance for the security of the capital³. The construction of fortresses and bastions along the Dardanelles by Mehmet the Conqueror immediately after the conquest of Istanbul is a result of this strategic understanding⁴. Additionally, the Ottoman navy's long-term use of Gallipoli as its center emphasizes the importance of the strait.

Four major naval battles took place in the Dardanelles during the history of the Ottoman Empire. These battles occurred in 1656-1657, 1807, and 1915⁵. Each of these battles, occurring in different historical contexts, provides important insights into the evolution of Ottoman naval strategy, technological developments, and changing international balances.

In this article, these four Dardanelles Naval Battles will be examined in chronological order, and a comparative analysis will be presented. The examination of these battles is important not only for understanding Ottoman history but also for shedding light on modern Turkey's maritime security policies. As Winston Churchill stated, "The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see⁶."

This study will address the historical context, causes, course, and consequences of each battle, and then analyze the common features and differences of these battles. Thus, the change in the strategic importance of the Dardanelles over the historical process and the relationship of this change with the general history of the Ottoman Empire will be revealed.

² George F. Bass, *Archaeology Beneath the Sea* (2005), pp. 172-175.

³ Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (1973), pp. 23-25.

⁴ John Freely, *The Grand Turk: Sultan Mehmet II - Conqueror of Constantinople and Master of an Empire* (2009), pp. 85-87.

⁵ Halil Ersin Avcı, "Çanakkale Boğaz Savaşları (Osmanlı Dönemi)", *Çanakkale Savaşları Tarihi, Vol. VI*, 2008; Cem Gürdeniz, *Çanakkale Savaşı ve Deniz Cephesi* (2008), pp. 15-18.

⁶ Richard M. Langworth, *Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations* (2008), p. 578

1. Ottoman-Venetian Naval Battles in the Dardanelles (1656-1657)

In the mid-17th century, the Dardanelles was a critical scene of the power struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice. The Dardanelles Battles of 1656 and 1657, which were part of the Cretan War (1645-1669), profoundly affected the balance of power in the Mediterranean and led to significant changes in Ottoman naval policy⁷.

1.1. The 1656 Dardanelles Naval Battle

In June 1656, the Venetian fleet, under the command of Lorenzo Marcello, blockaded the Dardanelles. This move aimed to weaken Ottoman control in Crete and cut off the empire's trade routes in the Mediterranean⁸.

On June 26, the Ottoman fleet, under the command of Kapudan Pasha Kenan Pasha, set out to break this blockade. The fleet was ordered to attack the Venetian fleet at the entrance of the Dardanelles instead of protecting the ammunition headed for Crete. The Venetians were waiting with a fleet of seventy ships, including those provided by European states, under the command of Admiral Mocenigo. The Ottoman ships were mostly manned by inexperienced sailors gathered during the campaign. There were also very few experienced sailors and captains to operate the warships. With the help of the sea breeze blowing from the sea to the land, and their superior technical knowledge and skill, the Venetian fleet severely defeated the Ottoman fleet. Only about twenty ships could escape. Many munitions, weapons, oarsmen, and ships fell into Venetian hands. The Ottoman fleet had not suffered such a defeat since the Battle of Lepanto⁹.

Following this, the Venetians besieged and captured Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Lemnos. Thus, they gained two important bases in front of the Dardanelles and on the way to Istanbul. When this situation was learned in Istanbul, it caused panic and also led to the black marketing of almost all goods in Istanbul due to merchant ships being unable to enter or exit the Dardanelles¹⁰.

⁷ Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (1991), pp. 184-185.

⁸ Caroline Finkel *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (2005), pp. 253.

⁹ Sina Akşin et al, *Türkiye Tarihi, Vol. 3, Osmanlı Tarihi 1600-1908*, İstanbul 1997, 5th ed., pp.32-35; Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayic'ül-Vukuat, Kurumları ve Örgütleri ile Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. I-II*, TTK, Ankara 1992, pp.258-261; Ahmet Rasim, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 2*, İstanbul 2000, pp. 77-78; Cemal Tükin, "Girit", *MEB, İ.A.*, pp.793-794; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. III/1*, TTK, Ankara 1995, pp.296-297.

¹⁰ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *ibid*, pp.298.

In the battle that started near Bozcaada and spread towards the Dardanelles, the Venetian fleet inflicted heavy losses on Ottoman ships thanks to its superior maneuverability and firepower. According to some sources, the Ottoman fleet lost more than 60 ships¹¹.

1.2. The 1657 Dardanelles Naval Battle

Following the heavy defeat in 1656, the Ottoman Empire quickly attempted to recover. Comprehensive reforms were initiated, such as the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as Grand Vizier and the restructuring of the navy¹². Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmet Pasha decided to launch a new naval campaign in 1657 to recapture the islands held by Venice, provide aid to Crete, and perhaps to restore the damaged pride. For this purpose, he prepared 70 ships and personally came to Çanakkale by land¹³. As a result of these efforts, in July 1657, the reorganized Ottoman fleet, under the command of Kapudan Pasha Topal Mehmed Pasha, set out to recapture Bozcaada and Lemnos.

The ships in the Ottoman Fleet were filled with inexperienced soldiers unfamiliar with the art of seamanship. Although Köprülü Mehmet Pasha did his best to ensure quality captains and soldiers, seamanship is a skill that requires expertise. In this respect, although there was a numerical equality between the Ottoman and Venetian fleets, it was not possible to make a comparison in terms of experience and knowledge¹⁴.

Knowing the condition of the fleet's soldiers, Mehmet Pasha took precautions by setting up cannons at Küçük Kepez on the Anatolian side and Soğanlıdere on the Rumelian side of the Dardanelles. On July 17, 1657, the Ottoman fleet attacked the Venetian fleet. During the battle, some of the soldiers on the ships jumped into the sea out of fear and swam ashore. Because of this, some Ottoman ships fell into Venetian hands. Enraged by this, Mehmet Pasha took a boat from Çanakkale to Kilitbahir. After he had seven to eight hundred people who had fled from the Venetians and come ashore shot, many of the soldiers returned to their ships and continued the

¹¹ Gábor Ágoston & Bruce Masters, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (2009), s. 127.

¹² Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (1999), pp. 143-144.

¹³ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *ibid*, pp.375.

¹⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *op.cit*, pp.376.

battle. After this, the battle continued for three days and nights with Ottoman defenses from land and Venetian attacks from the sea. On the fourth day, the Venetian fleet Admiral Mocenigo, whom Ottoman period histories called the “Blind Captain,” set out with his own command ships and those of allied states to capture the Ottoman flagship and destroy its fleet, thus seizing the Dardanelles. The Ottoman fleet could only hold on with the help of the cannons on the shore. Köprülü Mehmet Pasha was at a loss as to what to do in this situation. Just as Mocenigo's flagship and its escort ship, containing Venice's most elite officers and soldiers, were about to take the Ottoman flagship, a cannonball fired by a gunner named Kara Mehmet from the trenches at Kumburnu hit the ammunition store of the Venetian admiral's ship. Mocenigo's ship and the galleon accompanying it, which contained the most elite officers and soldiers of the Venetian fleet, exploded with a great blast. With this explosion, the order of the Venetian fleet was disrupted while the Ottoman sailors were encouraged. Thus, the Venetian fleet suffered a heavy defeat. After this, Köprülü secured the safety of the Dardanelles by recapturing Bozcaada and Lemnos in succession with a navy-supported amphibious operation¹⁵.

This time, the Ottoman fleet was more successful. Bozcaada and Lemnos were recaptured, and the Venetian fleet was forced to retreat. The Venetian commander Lazaro Mocenigo lost his life during the battle¹⁶.

1.3. Long-Term Effects of the Battles

These battles demonstrated that the Ottoman Empire's naval supremacy had been shaken. However, the success in 1657 proved that the Ottomans were still a powerful naval force¹⁷. The defeat in 1656 led to the rise of the Köprülü family in administration and to comprehensive reform efforts. These reforms played a significant role in the empire's recovery in subsequent years¹⁸.

¹⁵ S. Akşin et. al, *ibid*, pp.35; M. Nuri Paşa, *ibid*, pp.262-263; A. Rasim, *ibid*, pp. 76-81; C. Tükin, *ibid*, pp.794; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *ibid*, pp.376-378.

¹⁶ Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (1991), pp. 192-193.

¹⁷ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (2000), pp. 136.

¹⁸ Caroline Finkel, *ibid* (2005), pp. 255-256.

From a diplomatic perspective, these battles caused the strengthening of alliances among European powers against the Ottoman threat¹⁹. Additionally, following these battles, the Ottoman navy felt the need to improve shipbuilding technology and naval warfare tactics, which contributed to the modernization of Ottoman naval power in subsequent years²⁰.

2. The 1807 Dardanelles Naval Battle

2.1. Historical Context

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was faced with changing power balances in Europe. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain and Russia had formed an alliance against France. This situation put the Ottoman Empire in a strategically difficult position²¹. While the coalition wars against French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte were continuing in Europe, the Ottoman State was trying to establish good relations with France and obtain an alliance with France in the ongoing war against its old enemy, Russia. Meanwhile, Britain and its ally Russia, who were engaged in fierce battles with France, were uncomfortable with this situation.

2.2. Causes of the War

In 1806, the Ottoman Empire refused to close the Straits to French ships under pressure from Russia and Britain. Upon this, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Arbuthnot, gave an ultimatum to the Ottoman State, making a series of demands and threats, primarily the expulsion of the French ambassador Sebastiani from Istanbul and the abandonment of the alliance with France. When the Ottoman State rejected these demands, influenced by Sebastiani's advice, the British ambassador left Istanbul and joined the British fleet that had arrived off Bozcaada. These events led to Britain

¹⁹ Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (2000), pp. 210.

²⁰ Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (2005), pp. 193-194.

²¹ Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (2007), pp. 242-243.

launching military operations against the Ottoman Empire[1]²². The British government decided to threaten the Ottoman government by sending a fleet under the command of Admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth to Istanbul.

2.3. Course of the Battle

On February 19, 1807, the British fleet under the command of Admiral Duckworth entered the Dardanelles. The fleet consisted of 7 warships, 2 frigates, and 2 bomb vessels²³[1].

After the ambassador joined the fleet, the British fleet under Admiral Duckworth's command waited for suitable weather to enter the Dardanelles. On the morning of February 19, 1807, at 8:00 AM, the British fleet entered the Dardanelles. Admiral Duckworth's fleet, leaving two ships at the entrance of the strait, included two or three-deckers, six ships of the line, three frigates, and two brigs. As it was Eid al-Adha, Turkish soldiers in the strait's batteries were on leave. The guards in the batteries could not do anything against the British. The British fleet burned four of the Ottoman warships anchored off Nara and took two with them. Only one frigate showed strong resistance against the British here. The British also landed troops at Nara and rendered the fortifications there unusable.

When it was heard by the public and statesmen that the British fleet had passed through the Dardanelles and was heading towards Istanbul, great panic broke out in Istanbul. Even Sultan Selim III did not know what to do. Rumors began to circulate among the people in Istanbul that the apocalypse was coming, and that the end of the state and the world had arrived. Most statesmen wanted to immediately accept the British proposals and get out of this situation as soon as possible. No foreign fleet had ever passed through the Dardanelles and come as far as Istanbul since the city was conquered.

However, Sultan Selim III did not want to give up so easily or submit to the British. The French ambassador Sebastiani, who was in Istanbul, was also trying to persuade Ottoman statesmen on

²² Halil Ersin Avcı, *ibid.*; q. v. William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain, Vol 4, 1805–1807* (1837).

²³ Richard Woodman, *The Sea Warriors: Fighting Captains and Frigate Warfare in the Age of Nelson* (2001), pp. 274-275.

this matter, saying that no naval power, no matter how strong, could withstand a good land defense if not supported by land forces. Sebastiani's efforts and the Sultan's desire not to give up prevailed. The British fleet managed to overcome the Ottoman defenses in the strait and reached the outskirts of Istanbul on February 20.

On February 25, the demands of British Ambassador Arbuthnot from the British fleet that had arrived off Istanbul were conveyed to the Sublime Porte. Upon this, the Ottomans started negotiations as slowly as possible. Meanwhile, great preparations were being made in Istanbul. Nearly 1,200 cannons were placed on the European and Anatolian coasts, and about twenty Ottoman warships took battle positions in the Bosphorus. However, the British encountered unexpected resistance in Istanbul. The Ottoman government had strengthened the city's defenses with the help of French General Horace Sebastiani²⁴[2]. These preparations and diplomatic negotiations prevented the British fleet from carrying out an effective attack.

2.4. Result of the Battle

It didn't take long for the British to notice these preparations. They knew it wouldn't be easy to achieve anything against this firepower. They were also aware that the Dardanelles were not unprepared as they had been the previous time. They gave an ultimatum one last time, but the Sultan strongly rejected it, stating that no negotiations could take place unless they left the Dardanelles. Meanwhile, a group of British soldiers, including Admiral Duckworth's son, had gone out fishing in a boat when a group of Turkish soldiers attacked them, killing seven or eight and capturing as many, including the admiral's son. Sultan Selim III gave forty gold coins to the soldiers who delivered the prisoners to him and sent the admiral's son back to his father. When this news spread among the people and soldiers, everyone started to attack the British boats coming and going between ships by getting into boats. There were even people among the public who were thinking of attacking and capturing the British ships.

²⁴ Caroline Finkel, *ibid* (2005), pp. 389.

Seeing that the situation had turned against them, on March 1, 1807, after making a couple of showy maneuvers in front of Istanbul, the British set sail towards the Dardanelles. On March 2, after leaving the two Turkish frigates they had captured off Gallipoli, the British fleet entered the Dardanelles. The strait's batteries were raining bombs on them. Two British ships had sunk and others were damaged. On their return journey, they encountered the strengthened Dardanelles defenses. Ottoman artillery inflicted heavy damage on the British ships²⁵.

In this conflict, besides the two ships lost by the British Fleet, the British navy suffered 42 dead and 235 wounded, and their ships were seriously damaged²⁶. This news of defeat had a shocking effect in England, which had declared itself the ruler of the seas after defeating Europe's greatest naval power at Trafalgar just a year earlier²⁷.

2.5. Long-Term Effects of the Battle

The 1807 Dardanelles Naval Battle showed that the Ottoman Empire still had a strong defense capability. This victory increased the Ottoman's prestige and once again emphasized the strategic importance of the Straits²⁸.

This event also marked a turning point in Ottoman-British relations. Britain adopted a policy of protecting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as it understood the importance of the Ottoman presence in preventing Russia from advancing southward²⁹.

Moreover, this war revealed the need for modernization of the Ottoman army. The Nizam-ı Cedid reforms initiated by Sultan Selim III gained even more momentum after this event³⁰.

²⁵ Mesut Uyar, & Erickson, Edward J. **A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk** (2009), pp. 133.

²⁶ William James, **The Naval History of Great Britain, Volume 4, 1805–1807** (1837), pp. 320-321.

²⁷ S. Akşin et. al., **ibid**, pp.90; Fahir Armaoğlu, **Siyasi Tarih 1789-1914**, TTK, Ankara 1997, pp.92-93; Enver Ziya Karal, **Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. V**, TTK, Ankara 1994, pp.98-99; M. Nuri Paşa, **ibid, Vol. III-IV**, pp.211-214; A. Rasim, **ibid**, C. 3, pp. 188-202.

²⁸ Gábor Ágoston, & Masters, Bruce (eds.). **ibid** (2009), pp. 129.

²⁹ M.S Anderson,. **The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations** (1966), pp. 42-43.

³⁰ Stanford J Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol. 2** (1977), pp. 272-273.

3. The 1915 Dardanelles Campaign

3.1. Historical Context

With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire signed a secret alliance agreement with Germany on August 2, 1914³¹. On October 29, with the Ottoman fleet's bombardment of Russian ports in the Black Sea, the Empire effectively entered the war³².

3.2. Causes of the Battle

The Allied Powers planned an attack on the Dardanelles with the aim of knocking the Ottoman Empire out of the war, establishing direct connection with Russia, turning the situation in the Balkans in their favor, and shortening the war³³.

3.3. Naval Operations

3.3.1. Initial Attacks

The first bombardment, which began on February 19, 1915, targeted the entrance batteries of the Strait. These attacks aimed to test the strength of Ottoman defenses³⁴.

³¹ Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary* (1920), pp. 1-5.

³² David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (1989), pp. 137.

³³ Hamilton, *op. cit.* (1920), pp. 1-5.

³⁴ Tim Travers, *Gallipoli 1915* (2001), pp. 20-22.

3.3.2. The Naval Battle of March 18

On March 18, 1915, the Allied fleet consisting of 18 warships under the command of Admiral John de Robeck attempted to pass through the Strait. However, Ottoman mines and coastal batteries inflicted heavy losses on the Allied fleet. Three warships were sunk, and three others were heavily damaged[5]³⁵.

3.4. Land Operations

Following the failure of the naval attack, the Allied forces decided to launch a land invasion on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25, 1915. However, Ottoman forces, including Mustafa Kemal, showed fierce resistance[6]³⁶.

3.5. Results of the Battle

The Allied forces completely evacuated Gallipoli on January 8-9, 1916. The Gallipoli Campaign was a major defeat for the Allied Powers and an important victory for the Ottoman Empire[1]³⁷.

3.6. Long-Term Effects of the Battle

1. Strategic Impact: The failure to pass through the Dardanelles contributed to the prolongation of the war and Russia's withdrawal from the war in 1917³⁸.

³⁵ Nigel Steel, & Peter Hart, **Defeat at Gallipoli** (1994), pp. 65-70.

³⁶ Alan Moorehead, **Gallipoli** (1956), pp. 118-120.

³⁷ Harvey Broadbent, **Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore** (2005), pp. 288-290.

³⁸ David Stevenson, **1914-1918: The History of the First World War** (2004), pp. 205-206.

2. Decline of the Ottoman Empire: Although the victory extended the Empire's life by a few years, the loss of human life and resources during the war accelerated its collapse³⁹.

3. National Identities: The war played a significant role in the formation of Turkish national identity. It was also influential in shaping the national identities of Australia and New Zealand⁴⁰.

4. Rise of Mustafa Kemal: The success he showed in the war enabled Mustafa Kemal to emerge as a national hero, which became an important factor in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in the following years⁴¹.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In all three naval battles except for the 1656 war, the Turkish side was on land while the enemy was at sea. Even in the 1656 war, the fleet was saved from total destruction thanks to the Dardanelles Strait defense. The defense of the Dardanelles Strait has indeed been crucial for Istanbul's security since the earliest times in history. For this reason, no matter how much technology advances today, the Dardanelles Strait defense systems are too important to be neglected. This waterway needs a strong defense system.

The analysis of four major naval battles in the Dardanelles Strait provides very important military, strategic, and tactical lessons for Turkey's security. These lessons can play a critical role in shaping current and future security policies.

³⁹ Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (2008), pp. 175-177.

⁴⁰ Jenny Macleod, *Reconsidering Gallipoli* (2004), pp. 110-112.

⁴¹ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (1999), pp. 157-160.

1. Strategic Importance of the Straits

The defense of the Dardanelles Strait has been vital for the security of Istanbul and thus the state throughout history^[42]. Despite technological developments today, this strategic importance continues. Therefore, the defense systems of the Dardanelles Strait should be continuously updated.

Recommendation: While preserving the rights provided by the Montreux Convention, Turkey should strengthen its strait defense systems using modern technologies⁴³.

2. Land-Sea Cooperation

In the battles examined (except for 1656), the Turkish side was on land while the enemy was at sea. This situation emphasizes the importance of cooperation between land and naval forces⁴⁴.

Recommendation: The Turkish Armed Forces should increase exercises for integrated operations of land and naval elements and develop doctrines suitable for modern war scenarios.

3. Importance of Individual Heroism

The critical shots of Kara Mehmet and Corporal Seyit in the 1657 and 1915 wars showed that individual heroism can change the course of the war⁴⁵.

Recommendation: Military training programs should focus on developing initiative-taking and critical thinking skills as well as technical skills.

⁴² Cem Gürdeniz, *Mavi Vatan Yazıları* (2018), pp. 45-47.

⁴³ Cihat Yaycı, *Doğu Akdeniz'in Paylaşım Mücadelesi ve Türkiye* (2020), pp. 180-185.

⁴⁴ Edward J. Erickson, *Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign* (2010), pp. 110-112.

⁴⁵ Turgut Özakman, *Diriliş: Çanakkale 1915* (2008), pp. 320-322.

4. Importance of Naval Power

The inadequacy of Turkish naval power in the examined wars confined the defense to the Dardanelles Strait. However, Turkey's naval defense should cover a much wider area⁴⁶.

Recommendation: Turkey should establish an effective naval power in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas, strengthening the “Blue Homeland” concept. This should include building modern ships and submarines capable of operating in the open seas⁴⁷.

5. Air Force and Naval Integration

Today, the understanding that “whoever dominates the skies dominates the world” has gained importance. However, this does not diminish the importance of the seas, but rather requires the integration of air and naval forces⁴⁸.

Recommendation: Turkey should focus on developing air defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles that can be used from naval platforms.

6. Relationship between Commercial and Military Naval Power

It is seen that countries that have a say in world seas first build a strong merchant fleet, followed by the development of the military fleet⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ Cem Gürdeniz, *Mavi Vatan için Jeopolitik Rota* (2021), pp. 75-78.

⁴⁷ Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, *Güvenlik Stratejileri ve Deniz Gücü* (2019), pp. 150-155.

⁴⁸ Sam J. Tangredi, *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies* (2013), pp. 230-235.

⁴⁹ George Modelski, & William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993* (1988), pp. 16-20.

Recommendation: Turkey should strengthen its merchant marine fleet and carry out this development in parallel with increasing its military naval power. This will increase the country's power both economically and militarily.

7. Technological Superiority

The importance of technological superiority was clearly seen in the Dardanelles wars, especially in 1915⁵⁰.

Recommendation: Turkey should increase its investments in domestic and national defense industry, making technological breakthroughs especially in naval platforms, sensors, and weapon systems.

8. International Cooperation

The Dardanelles wars have shown the importance of international alliances and cooperation[10]⁵¹.

Recommendation: While maintaining its NATO membership, Turkey should also develop regional maritime security cooperations.

In conclusion, the lessons learned from the Dardanelles Strait Wars show that Turkey's maritime security strategy should be multidimensional and proactive. A strong naval power, effective strait defense, advanced technology, and international cooperation should be the cornerstones of Turkey's future security policies.

⁵⁰ Tim Travers, **Gallipoli 1915** (2001), pp. 270-275.

⁵¹ Ian Hamilton, **Gallipoli Diary** (1920), pp. 360-365.

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