Internal Party Democracy and The Struggle for Political Dominance between Party Leadership and Elected Public Officials in Nigeria and South Africa

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Abstract

Political parties have been known to play a crucial role in the democratic process if they embrace and institutionalize internal party democracy. Sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political party which is seen to adhere to the principle and practice of internal party democracy and the cordial and health relationship between the party leadership and elected public officials on the deliverance of democratic dividend through inclusive governance. The paper examine the extent the observance of the principle and practice of internal party democracy has enhance or reduce the struggle between party leadership and elected public officials over the control of the governance process in Nigeria and South Africa. The paper adopts the explanatory research design, documentary source of data collection and qualitative method of analysis. Anchoring our analysis on the principal agent theory, findings amongst others revealed that; in Nigeria the elected public officials become the leaders of the party at the national or state level as the case may be and assume control over the party affairs to the point of instigating the removal of the party leadership, or even forming a parallel leadership within the party. These actions by the elected political leadership have been one of the major threats in the practice of internal party democracy in Nigeria. In South Africa the party is supreme and exert control over elected public officials to the point of even asking the officials to resign their political positions when they (the elected officials) have fallen out of favour with the party leadership. The paper recommends amongst others that the party leadership should include party members in intraparty deliberation and decision making, and ensure that the party subscribes to and abides by the basic and universal democratic tenets as these actions will go a long way to enhance internal party democracy and democratic consolidation in both countries.

Keywords: Internal Party Democracy, Principal-Agent Theory, Party Leadership, Elected Public Official, Political Dominance, Democracy

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1.   Introduction

Democracy is an institutional framework that makes rulers principally dependent on citizens for power and by so doing, makes accountability in governance to take on paramount significance (Schedler, 1999; Lindberg, 2009: 11–13). Through elections that are contested on the platform of political parties, citizens can select leaders and then hold them accountable for the implementation of policies that instigate national development and benefit the broader populace. Political parties being the platforms, on which the political activities take place, are important agencies in making democracies work. In most advanced democracies, political parties supply the main channels for rendering governance accountable and representing public concerns, as they have been known to play a crucial role in the democratic process if they embrace and institutionalize the practice of internal party democracy, where members are given the opportunity to participate fully in party activities and in the decision-making process of the political parties. The hallmark of internal party democracy is increased participation in political activities, openness and inclusion of party members in the decision making process of political parties and the synergy between the party leadership and elected public officials in a liberal society like Nigeria and South Africa. This is a sin-qua-non and a major drive towards democratic consolidation and a favourable condition for national development.

Nigeria practices first-pass-the-post system, where in most cases, emphasis is placed on the candidates who are being voted for and not the political party that serves as the platform. The party system in Nigeria is such that an elected president at the national level or governor at the state level becomes the leader of the party at the national or state level thereby throwing the political system into tension and anxiety over the struggle that always ensue between the elected representative of the party and the party leadership to a point where the party leadership can be removed or suspended through the instigation of the elected representative. This has always given rise to intense struggle for the control of party structures between the party leaders, elected representatives of the party and some financiers who want to control both the elected officials and the party leadership thereby negating the principle of internal party democracy which is one of the tenets of democracy.

South Africa has been practicing a proportional representation (PR) voting system since 1994 where national and provincial elections take place once every five years. In these elections, voters vote for a political party, not individuals. The political party then gets a share of seats in Parliament in direct proportion to the number of votes it got in the election. Each party

then decides on members to fill the seats it has won (election.org.za). Political parties play a crucial role in the consolidation and institutionalization of democracy as sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political parties that have the power to recall an elected public officials who they feels that has deviated from their ideology or manifestoes.

There is a raging struggle in Nigeria currently, between the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) leadership, party Big-wigs and some elected public officials over the control of the party and the processes of leadership recruitment through the just concluded party primaries that threatens the stability of the Nigerian political system. South Africa is still dazed or reeling with the outcome of the struggle between the leadership of African National Congress (ANC) and former president Zuma who was the president of South Africa and Vice President of the party. As a sitting president, he was pressurised by the party to resign both as president of the country and vice president of the ANC in the early part of 2018.

The focus of this paper therefore is to critically examine how the struggle for political dominance between party leadership and elected public officials has given rise to tensions and anxieties within the political system of Nigeria and South Africa and the implications of these on the internal party democracy (where the opinions of members and their contribution to decision making and other activities within the party is encourage or otherwise), and the consolidation of democracy within the political systems under study.

The paper adopts a qualitative research design that is exploratory and historical in nature, as this is expected to provide a rigorous descriptive base which, among other things, will alerts party leaders and the national leadership to impact of their struggle for dominance on the democratic consolidation of their polities. Data for the paper is based on secondary sources, hence, there is heavy reliance on documented materials, while qualitative descriptive method was used to analyse our findings.

Anchoring our analysis on the principal agent theory, the paper hypothesised that idea of elected public officials becoming the leaders of their party at the national or state level and assuming control over the party affairs to the point of instigating the removal of the party leadership, or even forming a parallel leadership within the party has become the major threats in the practice of internal party democracy and the process of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. While in South Africa the party's excessive control over elected public officials to the point of even asking the officials to resign their political positions when they (the elected officials) have deviated from the party manifestoes has given rise to tensions

and anxiety within the political system whereby the security of tenure of the elected public representatives are not guaranteed out of fear of being recall by their party when they fall out with them. The paper is divided into six sections namely; introduction, conceptual clarification and review of related literature, theoretical framework, Nigerian political history, the struggle for dominance between party leadership and elected party officials of the all progressive congress, South African political history, the African national congress and the recall of presidents Mbeki and Zuma, and conclusion and recommendations

2.   Conceptual Clarification and Review of Related Literature

2.1   *Democracy*

Democracy is a concept that has been given various definitions by different scholars over time, but one idea appears to run through most of the definitions which is the greater participation of people in the process of governance directly or through representatives. Democracy as a form of government started from ancient Greece, (Athens). Onubi (2002) noted that Democracy simply means "rule by the people" thus; it is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Therefore, it is referred to as government of the majority. Democracy is also described as an idea, process of system of government (Agbaje 1999). Therefore, democracy entrenches and expands rights, ability and capacity of the citizens in a given society. Democracy is an institutional framework that makes rulers principally dependent on citizens for power (Bollen & Jackman, 1989: 612–618; Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990; Dahl, 1971: 8; Diamond, 1996: 53; Lindberg, 2009: 11–13). This way democracy makes vertical accountability take on paramount significance (Schedler, 1999; Attah, Audu & Haruna, 2014). Democracy is essentially a system of government in which the people control decision making. It is a system of government that ensures that power actually belongs to the people. It is an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle (on the platform of political parties) for the peoples vote" (Omotola 2006:27). Democracy is viewed as a governmental process which encompasses the competitiveness for power in order to control political decisions in an atmosphere where civil liberties are exercised through the greater participation of the populace. Democracy, therefore, now generally means that a people rule themselves through periodic elections of their highest leaders in which nearly all adults can participate, for whichever offices they are eligible, and under the rule of law (Attah, Audu & Haruna, 2014).

Internal Party Democracy and The Struggle for Political Dominance between Party Leadership and Elected Public Officials in Nigeria and South Africa

2.2   Internal Party Democracy

Political parties are one of the institutions that are carriers of democratic principles in any organised society. Thus, there are a number of 'institutional guarantees' that parties have to fulfil if they were to effectively meet what is expected of them in a democracy. One of such institutional requirements is internal (intra-party) democracy. As Magolowondo (n.d) (in Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011) points out, this very important institutional dimension is lacking in many political parties, particularly in emerging democracies. Scarrow (2004) noted that internal party democracy is a very broad term describing a wide range of methods for including party members in inter or intra-party deliberation and decision making. It is democracy within the party and the extent to which a party subscribes to and abides by the basic and universal democratic tenets. As Tyoden (1994) argues, hardly is a political system adjudged democratic without the central placement of political parties in its political process. This is because political parties are the major vehicles for the expression of an essential feature of the democratic process. In this case, however, inter and intra party relationships are vital because they determine the health and resilience of the party system and by extension the fate of democracy and the nature of the political system itself. In similar vein, Mersel (2006) asserts that various democracies in recent times have faced the problem of nondemocratic political parties, a situation where most parties only focus on external activities, neglecting internal planning and organisation. He argues that in determining whether a political party is nondemocratic, attention should be given to party's goals and practices. This is so because some parties often ignore essential elements such as their internal structures. The idea is that parties must be democratic not only externally in their operations, but also internally in the organisational functions. The interplay between parties and democracies should reflect the parties' adherence not only to democratic goals and actions but also to internal democratic structures (Mersel, 2006). Internal democracy aims at developing more democratic, transparent and effective political parties. It identifies specific challenges in the internal management and functioning of parties and party systems. These include: candidate selection, leadership selection, policy making, membership relations, gender, minorities, youth and party funding.

2.3   Political Party

Michels (1962:78) sees political party as 'a fighting organisation in the political sense of the word', while Sartori (1976:64) defined it as 'any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office'. Ware (1995:5)

suggested that it is 'an institution that seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to aggregate interests.' Considered to be an authority on political parties, Duverger (1963:17) stated that a political party is 'not a community but a collection of communities, a union of small groups dispersed throughout the country.' All these definitions offer valuable insights. They all use the concept of political party to designate a nationally and locally articulated political institution that has the ability to engage in political recruitment, to contest elections, to win maximum support at these elections, to control the decision-making positions and personnel of a government, and to make concerted efforts to implement a broad range of public policies (LaPalombara & Weiner 1966:29). It should be noted that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned attempts, no clear and agreed-on definition has been discovered and won acceptance in academic circles (Bell 1981:3; Blondel 1978:13).

According to Heywood, a political party is a group of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power, by electoral or other means. Parties are often confused with 'interest groups'. Heywood (2002: 248) identifies four characteristics that distinguish parties from other organized groups. Political parties:

- aim to exercise government power by winning political office (small parties may use elections more to gain a platform than to win power);
- are organized bodies with a formal 'card-carrying' membership. This distinguishes them from broader and more diffuse social movements;
- typically adopt a broad issue focus, addressing each of the major areas of government policy (small parties, however, may have a single-issue focus, thus resembling interest groups); and
- are united to varying degrees by shared political preferences and a general ideological identity (Heywood 2002: 248).

Without political parties or in situations where parties are weak and ineffective, politics is reduced to unbridled opportunism and the overt self-serving interest of individual politicians who may derail the nation-building process and the democracy project. Cited in Kellman, Doherty posits that 'without strong political parties and political institutions that are accountable and effective, that can negotiate and articulate compromises to respond to conflicting demands, the door is effectively open to those populist leaders who will seek to bypass the institutions of government, especially a system of checks and balances, and the rule of law' (Kellman 2004: 15). Sachikonye notes that 'historically, political parties have

played a pivotal role in founding and consolidating systems of governance. Parties aggregate diverse demands into coherent political programmes. They then translate these programmes into effective collective action through elections and legitimated control of political office' (Sachikonye 2005: 2). The primary reason for the existence of parties is to contest and capture state power (ideally through peaceful means). These peaceful means involve parties' contestation of power through regular multiparty elections (Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013).

2.4   *Political Party and Internal Party Democracy Nexus*

Scholars like Likoti (2005, 1) believe that political parties can add more value to democratization if they embrace and institutionalize internal democracy. For Matlosa and Sello (2005, 7), since political parties play a crucial role in the democratic process, "it is also incontrovertible that political parties are the key to the institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy . . . Sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political party." Adejumobi (2007) posits that the issue of internal democracy and the effective functioning of political parties are major challenges to political parties in all countries in West Africa, and there is a democracy deficit in the internal running of the parties as powerful interests and forces often control their internal mechanisms and processes.

2.5   *Party Politics*

Party politics: Party politics is the politics engaged in by, expressed through the channel of, or considered from the ideal of political parties as opposed to national interest (Nwankwo, 2001). Azeez (2009) also sees party politics as activities political parties in a democratic environment to dominate the polity through democratic institution. To this end, party politics exist when elective ideals are present in a democratic system and the views, opinions or political philosophies are debated with the consciousness of promoting and protecting the interest of the party in power. More so, party politics are activities of formal structure, institution and organization which compete through electoral mechanism to influence the people policies and programmes as well as allocation of public wealth through a stipulated and articulated procedure (Okoye, 1982). Though, party politics is ordinarily directed towards ensuring checks and balances in governance, strengthening the democratic institution and serve as feedback mechanism, however, its activities have been extremely abused through political rivalry, ethno-religious sentiment and making it undemocratic.

Political parties provide the platform through which party politics is given practical expression. This probably explains why Olaniyi (2001:99) defines party politics as 'activities of political parties in a democratic environment to seek for the control of political offices

through stated norms of elections'. It exists when elective principles are present in a democratic state which recognizes and institutionalizes the legitimate choice of the citizens to elect their representatives into political offices (Azeez, 2009). Hence, the primary objective of party politics is directed towards a single goal of accessing and controlling governmental or political power. In the submission of Okoye (1982), party politics includes 'activities of formal structure, institution or organization which compete through electoral process to control the personnel and policies of government, with the aim of allocating the scarce resources in a state through an institutionalized means or procedure'. There are arguments that the character of party politics in Nigeria is such that the political party in power at the centre stifles opposition parties. In the long-drawn controversy, Ayila (2006) Cited in Nyewusira and Nweke (2012:166), argued that party politics in Nigeria's democratic practice since 1960 shows that any political party in control of the apparatus of state, principally gained and sustained by control of the economy, plants moles and disruptive elements in opposition parties to create instability and render them ineffective to compete for power.

2.6   Party Leadership

Good leadership is important, indeed fundamental to the successful performance of organizations, nonetheless, the phenomenon of leadership clearly incorporates leaders involved in some type of innovative adaptation with followers, group objectives and organizational means, and problematic situations and contexts (Nye 2008; Grint 2005).

The following elements should be taken into account in defining political leadership:

- the personality and traits of a leader or leaders, including her or his ethical and cultural character;

- the traits and ethical-cultural character of the followers with whom the leader interacts (keeping in mind that leaders of different followers and followers of different leaders interact as well, cooperatively or competitively);

- the societal or organizational context in which the leader–follower interaction occurs – general culture, political culture, political climate, norms, and institutions;

- the agenda of collective problems or tasks which confront the leaders and followers in particular historical situations;

- the nature of the leader's interpretive judgement, since situations do not define themselves, but have to be defined by leaders' insights accepted by the followers;

- the means – material and intangible – that the leaders use to attain their ends and/or their followers' goals; these are 'the techniques which the leader uses to mobilize support on behalf of her or his agenda and/or to maintain support or position' (Peele 2005, 192);

- the effects or results of leadership (whether real or symbolic, long lasting or transient).

Leadership can be important when political actors wish to coordinate. As suggested by Calvert (1995), Myerson (2004), and Dewan and Myatt (2007), a leader can be focal, when a leader communicates he helps to unify expectations about how people will act. Leaders can also help people to learn. As Levi (2006) argued recently, "leadership provides the learning environment that enables individuals to transform or revise beliefs." Leadership is an essential feature of all government and governance: weak leadership contributes to government failures, and strong leadership is indispensable if the government is to succeed. Wise leadership secures prosperity in the long run; foolhardy leadership may bring about a catastrophe.

Party leaders are the public face of a party during election campaigns, exercise considerable control over the extra parliamentary party and its resources, lead the legislative party and in some cases the executive. Poguntke and Webb (2005) have argued that party leaders are becoming increasingly important in contemporary political parties. They suggest that leaders are accumulating power and influence in all three phases of party activity: legislative, electoral and organizational. There is no denying that party leaders occupy a central place in deepening of democracies. Political leadership overlaps significantly with the higher levels of military, legal, organizational, and religious and ideological leadership, and is a special part of 'social leadership' in general. Political leadership and followership account for significant differences across and within individual nation states in responding to both newer global problems and traditional governance issues.

3.   Theoretical Framework

The principal–agent theory deals with a specific social relationship, that is, delegation, in which two actors are involved in an exchange of resources. The principal is the actor who disposes of a number of resources. He or she then needs the agent, who accepts these resources and is willing to further the interests of the principal (Coleman, 1990, Braun & Guston, 2003). The principal-agent approach, based on the principles of rational choice and game theory, is used to understand the dynamics between a principal and an agent. The

principal delegates tasks to another in order to reduce information costs, and the agent carries on those delegated actions on behalf of the principal.

An established way of seeing and understanding the operation and benefits of representative democracy adopted through common sense and developed through widely accepted theoretical elaborations underlies the theory of action, in which the governing (elected) act in pursuit of collective interests (i.e., at the service of the (voters) who choose them in regular and periodic electoral processes to conduct public affairs). According to this vision, elected party officials are agents whom the people who are the principal had given their mandate to represent them on the platform of political parties whose ideologies (as contained in the manifestos of the political parties) appeal to (Pires & Guimarães, 2015).

The central argument of the theory is that because all individuals seek to maximize their positions with the least-possible effort, it is necessary to establish efficient punishment and reward mechanisms so a person placed at the service of another does not deviate from the latter's objectives and interests. That is, such a person does not take advantage of the privileged position he/she enjoys when conditions favour taking certain actions that are not always visible to his/her agent. In the specific case of representative democracy, the principal-agent theory provides convenient explanatory bases to understand how elected rulers eventually decide and act in a way that addresses median voter expectations. From this perspective, elections are therefore moments in which voters punish or reward elected representatives and their parties at the end of a period of achievements (i.e., vertical accountability). In this regard, the Nigerian and South African citizens serve as principal to through the platforms of the various political parties, to the elected officials to represent the wishes, aspirations and interests of the populace.

4.1 Nigerian Political History

The democratic process in Nigeria has been bedevilled with poor party politics as a result of lack of internal party democracy, ethnicization of party politics, poor political leadership, excessive westernization of the concept 'democracy', party indiscipline, lack of clear cut party ideologies among the ruling party, the politicization of the higher echelon of the military profession among others. As regard political socialization and recruitment, there is no doubt that the long years of military dictatorship negatively impacted on the democratic orientation of Nigerians. This pattern of orientation affected party structures which manifested in form of party indiscipline, mutual suspicion and conflict between Party Executive and Party Representatives in government, as well as poor political leadership as a result of non-submissiveness of elected political office holders to the core expectations of

their political parties. After decades of military dictatorship spanning regimes, Nigeria's returned to electoral politics in 1999 has seen democratic institutions remain underdeveloped and fragile – and to some extent, have even deteriorated, as exemplified by the attendant crises between party leadership and elected public officials on the platform of political parties, and the high levels of fraud and violence that characterised all the general elections that have taken place since the country's return to civil rule in 1999. In this context, political parties in particular constitute a weak link between the state and the society (Omilusi & Ajibola, 2016, p. 37).

What separates most of the First and Second Republic political parties from their present-day counterparts is that the former strove to pattern their politicking along unambiguous ideological lines. Under the colonial regime, they were essentially driven by a commitment to the nationalist struggle against colonialism, though in varying degrees of intensity. In the First Republic, politics and political parties were largely developmental. The regional governments and the political parties that controlled them were concerned mostly about wealth creation because that was the only way they could derive their revenue and survive. Similarly, the five political parties during the Second Republic— National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples' Party (NPP), Great Nigerian Peoples' Party (GNPP), and People's Redemption Party (PRP)— had distinct ideologies and manifestoes. Most people knew the four cardinal programmes of the UPN. Once elected into office, every UPN-state implemented the free education and free medical care programme of the party. Even the NPN (widely believed to be a conservative party) had its key programmes summarised on its logo (a house, with two corns by the side (agriculture), and a crown (governance). The NPN-controlled Federal Government launched its green revolution, a national housing programme, and insisted that it would offer good governance. Similarly, the NPP's neo-welfarist ideology/manifesto was symbolised in its logo (the people). Each party also had its core intellectual ideologues and powerhouses. For instance, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo published a book on "The Mission of NPN". Chief Ebenezer Babatope and associates led the UPN's scientific socialism; while Chief Chris Offodile was the brain-box of PRP's democratic humanism, etc. (Soludo, 2013:64).

The struggle for dominance between party leadership and elected party officials can be traced to the struggle for political emancipation from the British overlord. In the colonial history of Nigeria for instance, political parties were created as an instrument to facilitate either the transfer of power from colonial regimes to the local political elite; or they were formed by the

local political leadership to fight colonialism. Once the colonial state was driven out, political parties degenerated into ethnic and regional groups, acting in most cases as the vanguard of local hegemonic forces to meet their narrow interests. In such circumstances, the people could not have been empowered to have any say in how the political parties were governed. Key leaders who provided finance to the parties cashed in on their leverage to occupy top political positions both in the parties and in government. The national leaders of the parties were, in most cases, the owners of the parties, whose interests and world views ultimately became the objectives, manifestoes, rules and regulations of the parties.

Political parties were no less than the personal property of their leaders, who decided on who should be a member. That way, membership of political parties was exclusive, and further reinforced the disempowerment of the people and their lack of ability to participate in party and national politics. It is however important to state that political parties in the present dispensation are elitist based rather than being masses based. Thus, elitist interest tends to be of utmost interest to the political parties in terms of articulation and aggregation as a mechanism for survival. It is also important to accentuate that political parties also tend to manifest poor articulative and aggregative capability which has snowballed into cross-carpeting by politicians or the formation of new political parties. There seem to be total disregard for internal party democracy among the registered political parties particularly as it relates to the conducts of parties primaries where candidates were nominated to contest the general elections on the platform of their political parties (ObahAkpowoghaha 2013).

It took a strong alliance of the opposition which was controlling less than 30% of the national votes to defeat the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). The merger of some opposition parties with the aggrieved members of the ruling PDP gave rise to the formation of All Progressive Congress (APC) and was formally registered as a political party by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 31st July, 2013 as a mega opposition party in Nigeria. The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and a faction of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) all merged to form the All Progressive Congress (APC).

4.2 The Struggle for Dominance between Party Leadership and Elected Party Officials of the All Progressive Congress

The APC, which was registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on July 31, 2013 (by subsequently withdrawing the operating licenses of the merging parties), emerged from the ashes of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and a faction of the All

Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). The collapse of these regional political parties into the APC is a reminiscence or reincarnation of the pattern of alliance during the 1999 Presidential Election. Nigeria went into the election with three political parties namely PDP, APP and AD. While the PDP maintained a semblance of mass party, the AD and APP had the colouration of caucus parties. While the APP transmuted into ANPP in search of national outlook, the AD changed into AC and later ACN. The CPC represents a faction that pulled out of the ANPP led by Muhammadu Buhari. Apart from Governor Rochas Okorocha's faction of APGA, the APC is but a reincarnation of the 1999 alliance between the defunct APP and AD. The APC may have succeeded in taking over power from the then incumbent, it is noteworthy that the APC is an assemblage of political strange bedfellows. Accordingly, Nwodo (2013) cited in Nwangwu and Ononogbu (2014:71) observes that:

> within its motley crew of political operatives, the APC has some truly uninspiring tendencies. The ANPP, for example, is a party that has historically used Islamopopulism to win votes in the North and revels in smearing the PDP as a Christian and therefore "anti-Islamic" party. A frequently unremarked point is that the terrorist group, Boko Haram emerged in ANPP-controlled states and can be justifiably labelled a mutant outgrowth of the party's Islamo-populist stance. The ACN...embodies a strain of ethno-nativism particular to the Southwest (although it is admittedly far less insular than the old AD). The CPC is essentially a personality cult built around Muhammadu Buhari while the APGA represents a brand of Igbo populist irredentism.

The only pronounced ideological stance of the APC is that it prides itself as a progressive party. Progressivism relates to governments that take greater burdens off the citizens. The APC which purportedly arises to liberate Nigerians from the stranglehold of PDP has had government in states controlled by their governors demolish houses without alternative arrangements to resettle the people. Apparently, they stand for liberty but enforce demolition of houses without compensation (Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014).

The crisis in APC began when different people with different persuasions merged to form the party. These groups were the Congress for Progressives Change (CPC), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and a portion of PDP christened the new PDP (NPDP) and All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). Despite the merger, these tendencies (old party identities/party lines) have continued to manifest in the organisation of the APC at all levels, especially in the spheres of allocation of the spoils f office, with

accusations and counter-accusations among various groups of marginalisation, if not exclusion. Nigeria has long been plagued by weak political parties, and intraparty conflict is not new, so this trend may represent a reversion to, or intensification of, pre-2015 norms. Defections have become more alarming in the present democratic dispensation and have become more so in the build-up to general elections. Nigerians have continued to witness the drama of movement of party members especially of the two leading parties of APC and PDP. Several reasons account for this. The primary reason is the lack of internal democratic practice and culture in these parties (Adeyemi, 2014). Particularly in the ruling APC, the inability of the party to consolidate its internal party structure and effectively resolve internal rivalries in many states, has lead to violence, which has led to the disruption of party primaries and nomination processes particularly which has given room to mass defection from the party to the main opposition party and other parties CDD, 2018). Since political parties are essential elements of a democratic machine, it behoves them to be democratic in their internal operations. This, therefore, makes internal (intra-party) democracy a vital feature which political parties must possess to be able to reduce the rising tide of party defections and speed up democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Adeyemi, 2014). Recent developments suggest that tensions and divisions within the party continue to escalate. Notably, in early July 2018 a group of prominent APC members held a press conference to announce the establishment of the Reformed APC (R-APC). This breakaway faction from the party core, led by Alhaji Buba Galadima, a former ally of Buhari, presaged the defection later the same month of dozens of federal legislators from the APC to the PDP. Additional 'cross-carpeting' may follow (Page & Tayo, 2018).

Again during the recent party primaries the APC appears the worst-hit with crises of disagreement and disillusionment as a result of the fallout of the primaries whereby there was a serious struggle for dominance between the national party leadership and most APC states governors over who should control and coordinate the whole process. In Nigeria it is not possible for the party to recall the elected officials who has fallen out of favour with the party leadership or anti-party activities because Nigeria practices the first-past-the-post system whereby the candidates on the party's platform is voted into position by the populace who are more interested in the candidates than the party that projected the candidates.

States that are worst hit by the APC crisis are Ogun, Imo, Zamfara and Rivers, who may not present candidates in the upcoming general elections due to the internal crisis.

Internal Party Democracy and The Struggle for Political Dominance between Party Leadership and Elected Public Officials in Nigeria and South Africa

5.1   South African Political History

South Africa's system of government is essentially parliamentary rather than presidential. The President is elected by National Assembly rather than directly by the people and so he does not possess a personal mandate. The president is vulnerable to impeachment, or to a vote of no confidence by the majority of the assembly which would trigger a general election. As the fate of former president Tabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma demonstrates, their leadership of the governing party is a double-edged sword: the state president is subject to "recall". The three 'powers of government' (legislation, execution, and adjudication) are each assigned to a separate branch: the parliament, the president and cabinet together, and the courts. This separation of powers, regulated by a supreme constitution, hinders the concentration of too much authority in the presidency (Butler, 2013).

Apartheid officially ended in 1994. The first post-apartheid election in South Africa also was in 1994. National elections occur every 5 years. South Africa has a parliamentary system, with party list elections, which makes party choice extremely important. In a party list system, people vote for a party rather than for an individual candidate. Seats are allocated to a party proportionately to that party's share of the vote. Each party has candidates in an ordered list. Which candidates assume office depends on the candidate's place on the list and the proportion of the total vote that the party obtained. Thus, if there are 100 seats available in a legislature, and each party has a list of 100 candidates, if a party receives 20% of the vote, the first twenty candidates on that party's list will gain seats in the legislature. The major South African political parties are; African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP), Congress of the People (COPE), and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

All the elections are conducted by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, a permanent and independent body established by Chapter 97 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa to manage free and fair elections at all levels of government. Section 190 of the Constitution sets out the function of the Electoral Commission as follows:

> The Electoral Commission must manage elections of national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies in accordance with national legislation; ensure that those elections are free and fair; and declare the results of those elections within a period that must be prescribed by national legislation and that is as short as reasonably possible.

In keeping with this, the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 was enacted 'to make provision for the establishment and composition of an Electoral Commission to manage elections for national, provincial and local legislative bodies and referenda; and to make provision for the establishment and composition and the powers, duties and functions of an Electoral Court and to provide for matters in connection therewith' (Shongwe, n.d.).

Since 1948 the country had been ruled by the National Party (NP) under the racist regime of apartheid, or "separate development" for the four distinct "races" that constituted South African society, namely, white, black, Asian and coloured. Following the longstanding efforts of the liberation movements, growing political instability and the economic downturn of the 1980s, the white minority regime embarked on a four-year negotiation process with the oppositions that culminated in the first democratic election of 1994. As widely expected, the African National Congress (ANC) gained control of the executive presidency as well as a majority share of seats in both houses of parliament (i.e. the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces). The National Party remained in government only for a couple of years, as a junior partner, under the auspices of the "consensus" and power-sharing arrangements envisaged by the transition constitution (du Toit & de Jager, 2014).

Power relations within South African parties lie decisively with party leaders, particularly in parliament at the expense of ordinary members, members of parliament, and ultimately at the cost of accountability to voters. The PR system employed in South Africa is aided and abetted by the rules and procedures of Parliament itself, which give parties and caucus leaders the whip hand over MPs. Party lists not only give leaders a big say as to who goes to parliament, but also give leaders control over their MPs when they get there. Since PR lists require MPs to be members of a party, the loss of their party membership alone, means they forfeit their parliamentary seat. No Member of Parliament with any aspirations can therefore afford to vote on their conscience, or express the will of their constituents against the party leadership, without risking the loss of their seats. Needless to say, this gives enormous power to party bosses whose interests takes precedence over popular will (Kuye & Cedras, 2011).

5.2   The African National Congress and the Recall of Presidents Mbeki and Zuma

The ANC was founded on 08 January 1912, on the bedrock of uniting the African people against white-minority rule. It was established and led by early African Intellectuals whose methods of struggle were purely constitutional and legalistic. Its membership and leadership were composed almost entirely of intellectuals, teachers, priests, lawyers and chiefs. These categories of people constituted the elite of those days. Their approach to the fight for rights was therefore moderate and can be said to be also elitist. It was a body essentially of civilised

men who fought for the right to a vote for civilised men. Their strategy and tactics included to fight for adult African male franchise through sending memoranda, petitions and deputations to both Pretoria and the Crown in England. They acted in the name of and on behalf of both themselves and majority of the downtrodden, voteless, voiceless, African masses (Kgolane, n.d.).

Formally, the ANC is a highly centralised organisation. In practice the leadership cannot simply impose its will on the membership, and generally the system works through nominations from below, and appointments from above. Because "factionalism" is prohibited within the ANC, party members cannot mobilise or campaign against the decisions of the leadership from within ANC structures. (Such prohibitions have not prevented the rise of personalistic cliques at lower levels of the party, but these are factions of 'interest' rather than factions of 'principle' (Rigby). Immediately after 1994, charismatic ANC leaders in the provinces could use their public profiles as Premiers, and the provincial structures of the party, to campaign for national leadership positions. However, after Mbeki acquired the ability to appoint ANC premier candidates, and the NEC acquired the power to disband PECs at will, this possibility fell away (Kgolane, n.d.). The electoral successes of the ANC were not just the result of the legitimacy it derived from its leading role in the antiapartheid movement, but also of the formidable mobilization capacity that the organisation retained and developed. Election campaigns were conducted most effectively, combining the use of party structures, allowing for the participation of all party members down to the local level, with the women's and veterans' leagues, or sister organizations such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) Kuye & Cedras, 2011).

Within the ANC there are three primary factions, also known as the Tripartite Alliance, which include: ANC proper, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSTAU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) (Stratfor 2011). COSTAU is arguably the most powerful group represented in the Tripartite Alliance. It is South Africa's largest trade union federation boasting over 1.8 million members (Stratfor 2011). The Tripartite Alliance is arguably kept together by uncertainty engendered by the ANC's electoral dominance, combined with South Africa's particular electoral system. The ANC leadership do not expel COSATU and the SACP for fear that they would take a substantial percentage of the ANC's support with them. COSATU and the SACP do not leave because they still exert considerable influence, and perpetual opposition in a dominant party system is unappealing. The leverage of both parties in negotiations is however dependent on each claiming that they can do

without the other. Thus, while they are continually threatening to break up with the other, the relationship endures (Kgolane, n.d.).

An ANC code of conduct adopted by the national executive committee (NEC) in August 1994 stated, "All elected members" of provincial and national legislatures "shall be under the constitutional authority of the highest decision-making bodies of the ANC. Decisions and policies arrived at by the highest organ of the ANC NEC shall take precedence over all other structures, including our structures in Parliament and Government". The NEC was also given the power to institute disciplinary proceedings against any member suspected of "participating in organised factional activity that goes beyond the recognised norms of free debate inside the organisation and threatens its unity." The only real mechanism of accountability party members had over the NEC would be at the now five yearly national conferences, where that body is usually elected. The ANC also reaffirmed democratic centralism as providing the guiding organisational principles of the movement (Butler, 2013). The relative authority of the ANC caucus in parliament was further eroded through the deployment of senior party members out of parliament and into the executive, the state, and parastatal institutions, from 1996 onwards.

The chief instrument of control wielded by the leadership was through control over political patronage. This re-emerged as a factor in ANC politics soon after the ANC came to power. A Mail & Guardian article following the expulsion of Bantu Holomisa from the ANC spoke of the emergence of a "culture of fear" in the organisation. One anonymous ANC MP ascribed the increasing reluctance of party members to speak out to a fear of offending the party leadership with now possessed substantial powers of patronage:

> If people want to rise, they must be seen to be in good standing by certain people. Some people are keen to say certain things to enhance their positions - or because they already occupy a position they don't want to lose. The career aspect has never been a factor in ANC politics before - it's a totally new situation.

The ANC's electoral dominance has allowed the current leadership to marginalise many of its most able and charismatic leaders, without any noticeable loss of popular support. That said, the electoral system does provide an incentive to try and keep key leaders and constituencies within the (broad) ANC camp (Butler, 2013).

Since 1994, the ANC has been caught in internal struggles over ideological, material, and personality issues, which have led to splits that negatively affected the support base of the party. The first major clash surfaced in 1996 when the ANC leadership dropped the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for the Growth, Employment and

Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which was strongly opposed by its partners in the Tripartite Alliance – COSATU and SACP – because of its neo-liberal approach. The partners were particularly worried that they were sidelined in the process that led to the adoption of the strategy. This set the stage for internal tensions within the party which eventually led to a major breakaway from the party in the wake of its elective conference held in December 2007 in Polokwane, Limpopo Province.

The current rift within the ANC began when former president, Tabo Mbeki, fired his deputy Jacob Zuma in June of 2005. He was fired when it was discovered that his financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was found guilty of corruption (Rossouw 2009). Though Zuma was implicated in the crime, no charges were brought against him. In the midst of the corruption case, Zuma was also accused, but ultimately acquitted, of raping a young HIV-positive woman. The onslaught of bad press called for serious damage control on the part of President Mbeki. However, when he chose to fire Zuma, the ANC's rank and file revolted and demanded Zuma's reinstatement (Rossouw, 2009). The uprising forced Mbeki to reinstate Jacob Zuma as the ANC's deputy president, but he refused to reinstate him as the second in command of the nation as a whole. Despite these efforts to maintain control of the party, the ANC fired Tabo Mbeki in September of 2008. This move by the ANC created a ripple effect that was felt a week later when eleven of the President's ministers and three deputy ministers loyal to Mbeki all resigned (Rossouw 2009). These events laid the groundwork for the establishment of COPE, the first black opposition party in South Africa. COPE styled their campaign around Barack Obama's "hope and change" mantra as an attempt to attract voters fed up with the ANC's poor service delivery record, unaccountability and corruption (Rossouw 2009; Wieczorek, 2011). Public discontent was illustrated across townships in South Africa where protestors expressed their displeasure (Myburgh, 2005). Another important split occurred in 2012 resulting in the formation of the EFF following disagreements over the disciplinary actions taken against the then ANC Youth League (ANCYL) leader, Julius Malema (Isike & Onapajo, 2017).

The coalition which had elevated Jacob Zuma to the presidency begun to dissolve, and the President himself, a major asset in the elections of 2009, had become a major electoral liability, with numerous allegations that he had used state office to benefit his family and those around him at public expense. Further, the tripartite alliance which linked the ANC to the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), was openly divided. Not only had the expulsion of Julius Malema, led to

the creation of the EFF, but COSATU was faced by the prospect of a breakaway to its left by forces congregated around the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). In short, the ANC entered the election on the defensive, under widespread attack for having failed to reap the dividends of democracy (Southall 2014).

The new President was soon to be the first to face a vote of no confidence in the national parliament. And after this occurred once, in 2010, following a motion tabled by COPE and backed by the Democratic Alliance, it happened again twice, in 2015 and 2016, when it was the DA that raised the issue with backing from other opposition parties. Unsurprisingly, in all three cases the ANC parliamentary majority easily rejected the motion. But the votes of no confidence were a sign of growing dissatisfaction with ANC rule under Zuma. Zuma had come under mounting criticism both internally as well as internationally. On the domestic front, the President was haunted by corruption scandals and rising social tensions. The people in the townships, rural areas and squatter camps became bitter that democracy has not delivered the fruits that they see a tiny elite enjoying. Many of the leaders they revered have abandoned the townships for the Armani lifestyle previously exclusive to leafy white suburbs. They have long lost touch with the disgruntlement brewing in society. Internationally, on the other hand, the image of the President plummeted as the country seemed to epitomize worldwide political and economic uncertainties. A huge blow came at the 2013 Mandela memorial, where Zuma was booed and publicly humiliated before 90 world leaders, which was taken as a reminder of "just how distant Mr Zuma's South Africa still is from the rainbow nation ideal of shared prosperity, reduced poverty and social peace" (Giovanni, 2016). In February 2018 Zuma was again pressurised by his party the ANC to resign as the president of the Republic of South Africa and Cyril Ramaphosa emerged the new president thus confirming the supremacy of the party over elected public officials.

6.   Conclusion and Recommendation

A party having the power to recall a sitting president is possible in South Africa because of the PR system that is being practiced there makes it possible because people vote for party and not individuals, the parties then allot the seats won by them to their members depending on the number of seats won. The implication of this on the political system of South Africa is that the president belong to all the citizens of South Africa and not that of the ruling party alone even though the party's majority in parliament saw to his emergence as the president. Simply because the president has fallen out of favour with his party leadership is not a justifiable reason for the party to cause political and economic tension by putting pressure on the president to resign, especially in a situation where the conflict between the president and

his party leadership is most about personality clashes and not based on national interest. In the case of South Africa, the new president Cyril Ramaphosa must look beyond the party for advisers who will tell him what he might not always want to hear, instead of surrounding himself with sycophants as past leaders have done. He must also build direct linkages with the public, instead of reaching them only through party structures, because he is president of Republic of South Africa and not that of ANC alone.

In the case of Nigeria, the elected public official especially the positions of president and governors automatically become the party leaders either for the country (by the president) and states (by the governors). These tended to create constant frictions between the elected officials and the party officials over the control of the party by the elected officials on one hand and the control of the machineries of government by the leadership of the party on whose platforms they public officials were elected. Of recent, the ruling party in Nigeria the APC has been emerged in a political quandary by the national party leadership who are desirous of party supremacy, and the APC state governors who want to control the party affairs in their respective states. In some of the APC state controlled states lives have been lost while properties worth billions of Naira destroyed.

Further, political parties both in Nigeria and South Africa should commit to practical revival of judicial structures within them, to release members of these units from the conflict of interest, boost their integrity and ensure realistic circumstances for enabling negotiation of and dispute resolution functions for all disagreements in the party, amongst and between its membership and the party. Also, Political parties should ensure non-discriminatory conditions and circumstances to politicians and critical voices within them, considering criticism and different opinions as a wealth for the life of a political party and a catalyst and test for more internal democracy. Political parties should create an internal monitoring structure for adherence to the statutory norms and, each year, should report to the decision-making structures on issues related to functioning of statutory documents and rules of procedure. The APC should also strive to instil and maintain discipline within its fold and also practice internal party democracy to avoid the type of political mishap that the ruined the chances of the PDP to retain its hold on power at the federal level.

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